The Ukraine War and Eurasian Security

Will Arming Up Bring Lasting Peace?

This week Ukraine is on my mind. It will take a couple of columns to explain where we are, why what happens in Europe is important, and how to think about the future. Today I want to talk about the dangerous road we are currently on.

We are holding our breath waiting for the “spring offensive,” that might be more of a “summer offensive.” Or not at all. Worrying that the World-War-I-like slog from trench to trench will go on forever, costing lives and treasure Ukrainians will need to recover, sacrificing thousands of Russian lives, and devastating Ukrainian cities.

I think Americans are tiring of this war. A growing number of Republicans want to end US assistance to Kiev; so do some on the left. It’s just not our business say some; it has become too deadly, say others.

Here’s the thing. Achieving peace and security in the 9,000 kilometers from Brest to Vladivostok has preoccupied war-makers and diplomats for more than two centuries.  The frequent conflicts in this region destabilize governments, create havoc and ruin, and draw in powers from outside the region, creating wider, even global tension.

The war is not really about democracy, though that is the “rhetoric du jour.” Ukraine is a pitiful and weak democracy at best, riddled with powerful and corrupt private and public actors. And America has never hesitated to support corrupt, authoritarian regimes when it suited America’s interests - Hosni Mubarak, Mohammed bin Salman, Augusto Pinochet, Joseph Mobutu. Democracy is not really one of the “rules of the international order” President Biden likes to talk about so much, rules the US frequently violates.

What is at stake in Ukraine, in my view, is the sense of security any of us have when we live in a specific state. Security that we are safe from external attack or invasion from a neighbor. This is an older rule than the ones Biden is talking about. It’s about sovereignty and the inviolability of borders. The right for people to live in safety, be they Ukrainians, Poles, Palestinians, Kurds, Kuwaitis, Yemenis, or Rohingya.

This security is not a perfect right; it does not go unchallenged. But when it is violated, as in Ukraine, the future security for everyone is in doubt.

Broadly speaking, there are two ways of ensuring personal and national security.  One is to “arm up” and keep arming up to deter any potential adversary. The other, of which there is plenty of experience, is to “arm down,” controlling security risks through a reduction in tension and reassurance. 

This is not a binary choice, not a case of “peacenik” v. “hawk.”  Both military capabilities and diplomacy have proven effective and realistic over the past century. Ideally, statecraft uses both tools in synergy.  

So, back to Ukraine. Fear is at the heart of this war – fear of attack – on both sides. For Ukraine this fear is existential; for Russia, the fear is historical. Before we ever got to this war dramatic events had challenged the historical view of security for Russia: the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact (the alliance run by the USSR), and the evaporation of the USSR itself. These changes combined to raised a bigger question: what is the best way to make all the nations in the Eurasian region feel secure?   

Without absolving Putin from the aggression he ordered against Ukraine in 2014 and again in 2022, a lot of opportunities to go a different way were missed between 1990 and Russia’s seizure of Crimea. Putin missed some of them, but US and European diplomacy did not act to open the door to a different relationship with Russia, contributing to the rising tension.

Now we are where we are.  At some point the shooting will stop. I believe it will end with a whimper, not a bang, a cease-fire along lines not too different from where we are now. And the need for an agreement that provides temporary reassurance.

But such a cease fire resolves none of the underlying issues about Ukrainian, or, for that matter, Russian security. It simply freezes in place the status quo.

A longer-term solution is needed.  What is it that might guarantee long-term security not only for Ukraine, but for all of the countries along the line of confrontation and their supporters to the east and west of that line?

The way Ukraine’s defense has been assembled, we are headed toward the “arming up” policy. It is not the answer for long-term security. But it is where we are headed.

NATO members are celebrating the revival of the NATO alliance, the continuous flow of military equipment to Ukraine, the astonishing performance (so far) of the Ukrainian military, the absolute necessity of confronting Putin with military power, the importance of expanded European and US military presence in the “front line” states from the Baltics to the Black Sea, adding Sweden to the alliance, deploying missile defenses forward, putting NATO (US) tactical nuclear forces on alert, perhaps moving them forward, as well. Freezing hostilities along this path requires a major military buildup.

Beefing up the military presence to the west of the Russian border almost certainly guarantees the Russians will recover and do the same on the other side of the line. It is an inherently unstable status quo. Ukraine will not have the east of its country or Crimea back; the Russian military is likely to stay in place in both places. 

The can of combat will have been kicked down the road but will lie there waiting to explode during the next crisis. The Baltic republics will remain fearful that a Russian march to the sea will be through them. The Poles will continue to worry that they could be the next route for a Russian march west. Russia and NATO will continue the covert interventions that keep the Balkans insecure. Georgians will still fear a Russian attack and yearn for a NATO membership that never comes.  Azeris and Armenians will struggle forever over who owns Nagorno-Karabakh. And the Russians, looking at continuing NATO expansion, forward military deployments, and democracy rhetoric are likely to draw even more into an irridentist surliness and wounded pride, waiting for the next move that makes Russia less secure.

The current course toward an unsatisfactory cease fire and triumphalism in NATO will not bring Eurasia closer to peace and security.  It will cost the NATO countries precious treasure. The Germans will have to make good on the €100 billion promise they made for defense.  The United States Congress will continue to be unhappy about “free-riding” by the Europeans.

All this looks inevitable right now. If we see Russian imperialism as the problem, arming seems to be the answer. But if Eurasian security is the problem, maybe there is a different answer. Next week, in Part 2, I will lay out some of the options for the road not yet taken.